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Abstract
In this paper, I try to cause some good-natured trouble. The issue at stake is when
will we ever stop burdening the taxpayer with conferences and workshops devoted—
explicitly or implicitly—to the quantum foundations? The suspicion is expressed that
no end will be in sight until a means is found to reduce quantum theory to two or
three statements of crisp physical (rather than abstract, axiomatic) significance. In
this regard, no tool appears to be better calibrated for a direct assault than quantum
information theory. Far from being a strained application of the latest fad to a deep-
seated problem, this method holds promise precisely because a large part (but not all)
of the structure of quantum theory has always concerned information. It is just that
the physics community has somehow forgotten this.
1 Imprimatur
im·pri·ma·tur (ˆım´ pre-ma¨1ter, -maˆ1ter)
1. Official approval or license to print or
publish, especially under conditions of cen-
sorship.
— American Heritage Dictionary
The title of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop that gave birth to this volume was
“Decoherence and its Implications in Quantum Computation and Information Transfer.” It
was a wonderful meeting—the kind most of us lick our lips for year after year, with little
hope of ever tasting. It combined the best of science with the exotic solitude of an island far,
far away. One could not help but have a creative thought shaken loose with each afternoon’s
gusty wind. Indeed, it was a meeting that will make NATO proud. But, as any attendee can
tell you, the most popular pastime—in spite of those windy beaches and dark tans—was an
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activity just half-devoted to the conference title. The life of the party was all the talks and
conversations on “Decoherence and its Implications in Quantum Foundations.”
In this article, I am going to make an admission at the outset. Despite the industry of
work it has spawned for so many conscientious colleagues, and the absolute importance its
understanding holds for implementing quantum information technologies, I simply cannot
see that decoherence bears in any way on the quantum foundation problem. In saying this, I
am well aware of the jeopardy I bring upon myself. For I am but one person—one, in fact,
who makes no bones about how limited his knowledge is—while my decoherence colleagues
tell me that they are many. The press tells me that they are the “new orthodoxy.” Try as
I might, though, I just do not get it. Something about their program does not click in my
head.
The root of this problem could be many things, of course—not least of which might be
my supreme thickheadedness. There is, however, one thing I know for sure: My want of
understanding does not come from a lack of trying to understand. To the extent that I am
a relatively reasonable person—and presumably as conscientious as the enthusiasts of the
“new orthodoxy”—it seems to me this is a datum that should not go unnoticed. Why might
it be that an honest outsider is having so much trouble coming to grips with something the
indoctrinated profess to see with great clarity? I cannot stop myself from thinking, “Where
there is smoke, there is smoke.”
But let me put that aside: What I wish to get at with this self-sanctioned imprimatur
is not a detailed criticism of the decoherence-based quantum-foundations programs. I say
all these things instead to provide a particular instantiation (and a little background) for
what I deem to be a significantly larger problem in the quantum-foundations efforts to
date. My reluctance, or more accurately, my inability, to toe the line for any of the rival
quantum political parties—be they the Bohmians [1], the Consistent Historians [2], the
Einselectionists [3], the Spontaneous Collapsicans [4], or the Everettistas [5]—springs from a
distrust captured vividly by the image of a political convention. The relevant point is, what
are their platforms?
Throughout the 2000 presidential campaign in America, the Green Party accused the
Democrats and the Republicans of having no difference whatsoever in their platforms. The
Democrats and Republicans were appalled. Likewise, to what I suspect will be a jaw-
dropping shock to the quantum-party leaders, I declare that I can see little to no difference
in any of their beliefs. They all look equally pale to me. For though everyone seems to
want a little reality—i.e., something in the theory that they can point to and say, “There,
that term is what is real in the universe even when there are no physicists about”—none are
willing to dig very deep for it.
What I mean by this deliberately provocative statement is that in spite of the differences
in what the various parties are willing to label1 “real” in quantum theory,2 they nonetheless
1Or add to the theory, as the case may be.
2Very briefly, a cartoon of the positions might be as follows. For the Bohmians, “reality” is captured
by supplementing the state vector with an actual trajectory in coordinate space. For the Everettistas, it is
the universal wave function and the universe’s Hamiltonian. (Depending upon the faction, though, these
two entities are sometimes supplemented with the terms in various Schmidt decompositions of the universal
state vector with respect to a preconceived tensor-product structure.) For the Spontaneous Collapsicans it is
again the state vector—though now for the individual system—but Hamiltonian dynamics is supplemented
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all proceed from essentially the same abstract starting point. It is nothing other than the
standard textbook accounts of the axioms of quantum theory.3
The Platform for Most Quantum Foundations Ventures:
The Axioms (plain and simple)
1. For every system, there is a complex Hilbert space H.
2. States of the system correspond to projection operators onto H.
3. Those things that are observable somehow correspond to the
eigenprojectors of Hermitian operators.
4. Isolated systems evolve according to the Schro¨dinger equation.
...
“But what nonsense is this,” you must be asking. “Where else could they start!?!” The
main issue is this, and no one has said it more clearly than Carlo Rovelli [6]. Where present-
day quantum-foundation studies have stagnated in the stream of history is not so unlike
where the physics of length contraction and time dilation stood before Einstein’s 1905 paper
on special relativity.
The Lorentz transformations have the name that they do, rather than, say, the Ein-
stein transformations, for a simple historical reason: Lorentz had published some of them
as early as 1895.4 Indeed one could say that most of the empirical predictions of special
relativity were in place well before Einstein came onto the scene. But that was of little
consolation to the pre-Einsteinian physics community striving so hard to make sense of elec-
tromagnetic phenomena and the luminiferous ether. Precisely because the only justification
for the Lorentz transformations appeared to be their empirical adequacy, they remained a
mystery to be conquered. More particularly, this was a mystery that heaping further ad hoc
(mathematical) structure onto could not possibly solve.
What was being begged for in the years between 1895 and 1905 was an understanding of
the origin of that abstract, mathematical structure—some simple, crisp physical statements
with respect to which the necessity of the mathematics would be indisputable. Einstein
supplied that and became one of the greatest physicists of all time. He reduced the mysterious
structure of the Lorentz transformations to two simple statements that could be written in
any common language:
with an objective collapse mechanism. For the Consistent Historians “reality” is captured with respect to
an initial quantum state and a Hamiltonian by the addition of a set of preferred positive-operator valued
measures (POVMs)—they call them consistent sets of histories—along with a truth-value assignment within
each of those sets. For the Einselectionists, I leave it as an exercise to the reader.
3To be fair, they do, each in their own way, contribute minor modifications to the meanings of a few
words in the axioms. But that is essentially where the effort stops.
4Though, FitzGerald had considered length contraction as early as 1889.
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1) the speed of light in empty space is independent of the speed of its source,
2) physics should appear the same in all inertial reference frames.
The deep significance of this for the quantum problem should stand out and speak overpow-
eringly to anyone who admits the simplicity of these principles.
Einstein’s move effectively stopped all further debate on the origins of the Lorentz trans-
formations. Outside of the time of the Nazi regime in Germany, I suspect there have been
less than a handful of conferences devoted to “interpreting” them. More importantly, with
the supreme simplicity of Einstein’s principles, physics became ready for “the next step.” Is
it possible to imagine that any mind—even Einstein’s—could have made the leap to general
relativity directly from the original, abstract structure of the Lorentz transformations? A
structure that was only empirically adequate? I would say no. Indeed, one might question
what wonders we will find by pursuing the same strategy of simplification for the quantum
foundations.
Symbolically, where we are: Where we need to be:
x′ =
x− vt√
1− v2/c2
Speed of light
is constant.
t′ =
t− vx/c2√
1− v2/c2
Physics is the same
in all inertial frames.
The task is not to make sense of the quantum axioms by heaping more structure, more
definitions, more science-fiction imagery on top of them, but to throw them away wholesale
and start afresh. We should be relentless in asking ourselves: From what deep physical
principles might we derive this exquisite mathematical structure? Those principles should
be crisp; they should be compelling. They should stir the soul. When I was in junior high
school, I sat down with Martin Gardner’s book Relativity for the Million and came away with
an understanding of the subject that sustains me even today: The concepts were strange to
my everyday world, but they were clear enough that I could get a grasp of them knowing little
more mathematics than arithmetic. One should expect nothing less for a proper foundation
to the quantum. Until we can explain the essence of the theory to a junior high-school or
high-school student—the essence, not the mathematics!—and have them walk away with a
deep, lasting memory, I well believe we will have not understood a thing about quantum
foundations.
But I am not fooling myself. I know that anyone with a vested interest in any of the
existing quantum interpretations will be quick to point out every hole, every nonnecessity
in the sermon I just gave. Indeed, I can feel the upcoming wrath of their email as I write
this sentence. I have no retort. Only a calm confidence that if progress is not made in
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this direction, 100 years from now the political pollster will still have a niche at the latest
quantum foundations meeting [7].
So, throw the existing axioms of quantum mechanics away and start afresh! But how
to proceed? I myself see no alternative but to contemplate deep and hard the tasks, the
techniques, and the implications of quantum information theory. The reason is simple, and
I think inescapable. Quantum mechanics has always been about information. It is just that
the physics community has somehow forgotten this.
Quantum Mechanics:
The Axioms and Our Imperative!
1. States correspond to density Give an information theoretic reason
operators ρ over a Hilbert space H. if possible!
2. Measurements correspond to positive
operator-valued measures (POVMs) Give an information theoretic reason
{Eb} on H. if possible!
3. H is a complex vector space,
not a real vector space, not a Give an information theoretic reason
quaternionic module. if possible!
4. Systems combine according to the tensor
product of their separate vector Give an information theoretic reason
spaces, HAB = HA ⊗HB. if possible!
5. Between measurements, states evolve
according to trace-preserving completely Give an information theoretic reason
positive linear maps. if possible!
6. By way of measurement, states evolve
(up to normalization) via outcome- Give an information theoretic reason
dependent completely positive linear maps. if possible!
7. Probabilities for the outcomes
of a measurement obey the Born rule Give an information theoretic reason
for POVMs tr(ρEb). if possible!
This table is my plea to the community. Our foremost task should be to go to each and
every axiom of quantum theory and give it an information theoretic justification if we can.
Only when we are finished picking off all the terms (or combinations of terms) that can be
interpreted as information—subjective information—will we be in a position to make real
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progress. The raw distillate that is left behind, miniscule though it may be, will be our first
glimpse of what quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about nature itself.
2 Introduction
This paper is about taking that plea to heart, though it contributes only a small amount
to the labor it asks. Just as in the founding of quantum mechanics, this is not something
that will spring forth from a lone mind in the shelter of a medieval college. It is a task for
a community with diverse but productive points of view. The quantum information com-
munity is nothing if not that. “Philosophy is too important to be left to the philosophers,”
John Archibald Wheeler once said. Likewise, I am apt to say the same for the quantum
foundations.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 3 “Why Infor-
mation?,” I reiterate the cleanest argument I know of that the quantum state is solely an
expression of information—the information one has about a quantum system. It has no ob-
jective reality in and of itself. The argument is then refined by considering the phenomenon
of quantum teleportation [8].
In Section 4 “Information About What?,” I tackle that very question [9] head-on.
The answer is, “nothing more than the potential consequences of our experimental inter-
ventions into nature.” Once freed from the notion that quantum measurement ought to
be about revealing traces of some preexisting property [10] (or beable [11]), one finds no
particular reason to take the standard account of measurement (in terms of complete sets
of orthogonal projection operators) as a basic notion. Indeed quantum information theory,
with its emphasis on the utility of generalized measurements or positive operator-valued
measures (POVMs) [12], suggests one should take those entities as the basic notion instead.
The productivity of this point of view is demonstrated by the beautifully simple Gleason-like
derivation of the quantum probability rule recently found by Paul Busch [14] and, indepen-
dently, by Joseph Renes and collaborators [15]. Contrary to Gleason’s original theorem [16],
this theorem works just as well for two-dimensional Hilbert spaces, and even for Hilbert
spaces over the field of rational numbers.
In Section 5 “Whither Bayes Rule?,” I ask why one should expect the rule for updating
quantum state assignments upon the completion of a measurement to take the form it actu-
ally does. Along the way, I give a simple derivation that one’s information always increases
on average for any quantum mechanical measurement that does not itself discard informa-
tion. (Despite the appearance otherwise, this is not a tautology!) More importantly, the
proof technique used for showing the theorem indicates an extremely strong analogy between
quantum collapse and Bayes’ rule in classical probability theory: Up to an overall unitary
“readjustment” of one’s knowledge (that takes into account details of the measurement in-
teraction as well as one’s initial state of knowledge), quantum collapse is precisely Bayesian
conditionalization. This in turn gives even more impetus for the assumptions behind the
Gleason-like theorem of the previous section.
In Section 6 “Wither Entanglement?,” I ask whether entanglement is all it is cracked-
up to be as far as quantum foundations are concerned. In particular, I give a simple derivation
of the tensor-product rule for combining Hilbert spaces of individual systems into a larger
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composite system. To no surprise, once again this comes from Gleason-like considerations for
local measurements in the presence of classical communication—the very bread and butter
of much of quantum information theory.
In Section 7 “Unknown Quantum States?,” I tackle the conundrum posed by these
very words. Despite the phrase’s ubiquitous use in the quantum information literature,
what can an unknown state possibly be? A quantum state—from the present point of view,
explicitly someone’s information—must always be known by someone, if it exists at all.
On the other hand, for many an application in quantum information, it would be quite a
contrivance to imagine there is always someone in the background with extra knowledge of
the system being measured or manipulated. The solution, at least in the case of quantum
state tomography [13], is found through a quantum mechanical version of de Finetti’s classic
theorem on “unknown probabilities.” This reports work from Refs. [17] and [18]. Maybe one
of the most interesting things about the theorem is that it fails for Hilbert spaces over the
field of real numbers, suggesting that perhaps the whole discipline of quantum information
might not be well defined in that imaginary world.
Finally, in Section 8 “The Oyster and the Quantum,” I flirt with the most tantalizing
question of all: Why the quantum? There are no answers here, but I do not discount that
there will be one within 20 years. In this regard no platform seems firmer for the leap than
the very existence of quantum cryptography and quantum computing. The world is sensitive
to our touch. It has a kind of “Zing!”5 that makes it fly off in ways that were not imaginable
classically. The whole structure of quantum mechanics—it is speculated—may be nothing
more than the optimal method of reasoning and processing information in the light of such
a fundamental (wonderful) sensitivity.
3 Why Information?
It may be, as one French physicist put it,
“the fog from the north,” but the Copen-
hagen interpretation remains the best in-
terpretation of the quantum that we have.
— John Archibald Wheeler
New York Times, 12 December 2000
Einstein was the master of clear thought. I have already expressed my reasons for thinking
this in the arena of electromagnetic phenomena. Likewise, I would say he possessed the same
great penetrating power when it came to analyzing the quantum. For even there, he was
immaculately clear and concise in his expression. In particular, he was the first person to say
in absolutely unambiguous terms why the quantum state should be viewed as information
(or, to say the same thing, as a representation of one’s knowledge).
His argument was simply that a quantum-state assignment for a system can be forced
to go one way or the other by interacting with a part of the world that should have no
causal connection with the system of interest. The paradigm here is of course the one well
5Dash, verve, vigor, vim, zip, pep, punch, pizzazz!
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known through the Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen paper [19], but simpler versions of the train
of thought had a long pre-history with Einstein [20].
The best was in essence this. Take two spatially separated systems A and B prepared in
some entangled quantum state |ψAB〉. By performing the measurement of one or another of
two observables on system A alone, one can immediately write down a new state for system
B. Either the state will be drawn from one set of states {|φBi 〉} or another {|η
B
i 〉}, depending
upon which observable is measured.6 The key point is that it does not matter how distant
the two systems are from each other, what sort of medium they might be immersed in, or any
of the other fine details of the world. Einstein concluded that whatever these things called
quantum states be, they cannot be “real states of affairs” for system B alone. For, whatever
the real, objective state of affairs at B is, it should not depend upon the measurements one
can make on a causally unconnected system A.
Thus one must take it seriously that the new state (either a |φBi 〉 or a |η
B
i 〉) represents
partial knowledge about system B. In making a measurement on A, one learns something
about B, but that is where the story ends. The state change cannot be construed to be
something more physical than that. More particularly, the state itself cannot be viewed as
more than a reflection of the knowledge gained through the measurement. Expressed in the
language of Einstein, the quantum state cannot be a “complete” description of the quantum
system.
Here is the way Einstein put it to Michele Besso in a 1952 letter [22]:
What relation is there between the “state” (“quantum state”) described by a func-
tion ψ and a real deterministic situation (that we call the “real state”)? Does the
quantum state characterize completely (1) or only incompletely (2) a real state? . . .
I reject (1) because it obliges us to admit that there is a rigid connection between
parts of the system separated from each other in space in an arbitrary way (instanta-
neous action at a distance, which doesn’t diminish when the distance increases). Here
is the demonstration: . . .
If one considers the method of the present quantum theory as being in principle
definitive, that amounts to renouncing a complete description of real states. One could
justify this renunciation if one assumes that there is no law for real states—i.e., that
their description would be useless. Otherwise said, that would mean: laws don’t apply
to things, but only to what observation teaches us about them. (The laws that relate to
the temporal succession of this partial knowledge are however entirely deterministic.)
Now, I can’t accept that. I think that the statistical character of the present theory
is simply conditioned by the choice of an incomplete description.
There are two issues in this letter that are worth disentangling. 1) Rejecting the rigid
connection of all nature7—that is to say, admitting that the very notion of separate systems
6Generally there need be hardly any relation between the two sets of states: only that when the states are
weighted by their probabilities, they mix together to form the initial density operator for system B alone.
For a precise statement of this freedom, see Ref. [21].
7The rigid connection of all nature, on the other hand, is exactly what the Bohmians and Everettistas
do embrace, even glorify. So, I suspect these words will fall on deaf ears with them. But similarly would
they fall on deaf ears with the believer who says that God wills each and every event in the universe and
no further explanation is needed. No point of view should be dismissed out of hand: the overriding issue is
simply which view will lead to the most progress, which view has the potential to close the debate, which
view will give the most new phenomena for the physicist to have fun with?
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has any meaning at all—one is led to the conclusion that a quantum state cannot be a
complete specification of a system. It must be information, at least in part. This point
should be placed in contrast to the other well-known facet of Einstein’s thought: namely,
2) an unwillingness to accept such an “incompleteness” as a necessary trait of the physical
world.
It is quite important to recognize that the first issue does not entail the second. Einstein
had that firmly in mind, but he wanted more. His reason for going the further step was, I
think, well justified at the time [23]:
There exists [...] a simple psychological reason for the fact that this most nearly
obvious interpretation is being shunned. For if the statistical quantum theory does not
pretend to describe the individual system (and its development in time) completely,
it appears unavoidable to look elsewhere for a complete description of the individual
system; in doing so it would be clear from the very beginning that the elements of
such a description are not contained within the conceptual scheme of the statistical
quantum theory. With this one would admit that, in principle, this scheme could not
serve as the basis of theoretical physics.
But the world has seen much in the mean time. The last seventeen years have given con-
firmation after confirmation that the Bell inequality (and several variations of it) are indeed
violated by the physical world. The Kochen-Specker no-go theorems have been meticulously
clarified to the point where simple textbook pictures can be drawn of them [24]. Incom-
pleteness, it seems, is here to stay: The theory prescribes that no matter how much we
know about a quantum system—even when we have maximal information about it—there
will always be a statistical residue. There will always be questions that we can ask of a
system for which we cannot predict the outcomes. In quantum theory, maximal information
is simply not complete information [25]. But neither can it be completed. As Wolfgang
Pauli once wrote to Markus Fierz [26], “The well-known ‘incompleteness’ of quantum me-
chanics (Einstein) is certainly an existent fact somehow-somewhere, but certainly cannot be
removed by reverting to classical field physics.” Nor, I would add, will the mystery of that
“existent fact” be removed by attempting to give the quantum state anything resembling an
ontological status.
The complete disconnectedness of the quantum-state change rule from anything to do
with spacetime considerations is telling us something deep: The quantum state is informa-
tion. Subjective, incomplete information. Put in the right mindset, this is not so intolerable.
It is a statement about our world. There is something about the world that keeps us from
ever getting more information than can be captured through the formal structure of quan-
tum mechanics. Einstein had wanted us to look further—to find out how the incomplete
information could be completed—but perhaps the real question is, “Why can it not be
completed?”
Indeed I think this is one of the deepest questions we can ask and still hope to answer.
But first things first. The more immediate question for anyone who has come this far—and
one that deserves to be answered forthright—is what is this information symbolized by a |ψ〉
actually about? I have hinted that I would not dare say that it is about some kind of hidden
variable (as the Bohmian might) or even about our place within the universal wavefunction
(as the Everettista might).
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Perhaps the best way to build up to an answer is to be true to the title of this paper:
quantum foundations in the light of quantum information. Let us forage the phenomena of
quantum information to see if we might first refine Einstein’s argument. One need look no
further than to the phenomenon of quantum teleportation [8]. Not only can a quantum-state
assignment for a system be forced to go one way or the other by interacting with another
part of the world of no causal significance, but, for the cost of two bits, one can make that
quantum state assignment anything one wants it to be.
Such an experiment starts out with Alice and Bob sharing a maximally entangled pair
of qubits in the state |ψAB〉 =
√
1
2
(|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉). Bob then goes to any place in the
universe he wishes. Alice in her laboratory prepares another qubit with any state |ψ〉 that
she ultimately wants to impart onto Bob’s system. She performs a Bell-basis measurement
on the two qubits in her possession. In the same vein as Einstein’s thought experiment,
Bob’s system immediately takes on the character of one of the states |ψ〉, σx|ψ〉, σy|ψ〉, or
σz|ψ〉. But that is only insofar as Alice is concerned.
8 Since there is no (reasonable) causal
connection between Alice and Bob, it must be that these states represent the possibilities
for Alice’s new knowledge of Bob’s system.
If now Alice broadcasts the result of her measurement to the world, Bob may complete
the teleportation protocol by performing one of the four Pauli rotations (I, σx, σy, σz) on
his system, conditioning it on the information he receives. The result, as far as Alice is
concerned, is that Bob’s system finally resides predictably in the state |ψ〉.9
How can Alice convince herself that such is the case? Well, if Bob is willing to reveal
his location, she just need walk to his site and perform the YES-NO measurement: |ψ〉〈ψ|
vs. I − |ψ〉〈ψ|. The outcome will be a YES with probability one if all has gone well in
carrying out the protocol. Thus, for the cost of a measurement on a causally disconnected
system and two bits worth of causal action on the system of actual interest—i.e., one of
the four Pauli rotations—Alice can sharpen her predictability to complete certainty for any
YES-NO observable she wishes.
Roger Penrose argues in his book The Emperor’s New Mind [27] that when a system
“has” a state |ψ〉 there ought to be some property in the system (in and of itself) that
corresponds to its “|ψ〉’ness.” For how else could the system be prepared to reveal a YES
in the case that Alice actually checks it? Asking this rhetorical question with a sufficient
amount of command is enough to make many a would-be informationist weak in knees.
But there is a crucial oversight implicit in its confidence, and we have already caught it in
action. If Alice fails to reveal her information to anyone else in the world, there is no one
else who can predict the qubit’s ultimate revelation with certainty. More importantly, there
is nothing in quantum mechanics that gives the qubit the power to stand up and say YES
all by itself: If Alice does not take the time to walk over to it and interact with it, there is
no revelation. There is only the confidence in Alice’s mind that, should she interact with it,
she could predict the consequence of that interaction.
8As far as Bob is concerned, nothing whatsoever changes about the system in his possession: It started
in the completely mixed state ρ = 1
2
I and remains that way.
9As far as Bob is concerned, nothing whatsoever changes about the system in his possession: It started
in the completely mixed state ρ = 1
2
I and remains that way.
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4 Information About What?
[S]urely, the existence of [the] world is the
primary experimental fact of all, without
which there would be no point to physics
or any other science; and for which we all
receive new evidence every waking minute
of our lives. This direct evidence of our
senses is vastly more cogent than are any
of the deviously indirect experiments that
are cited as evidence for the Copenhagen
interpretation.
— E. T. Jaynes, 1986
The criticism of the Copenhagen interpre-
tation of the quantum theory rests quite
generally on the anxiety that, with this in-
terpretation, the concept of “objective re-
ality” which forms the basis of classical
physics might be driven out of physics.
. . . [T]his anxiety is groundless . . . At this
point we realize the simple fact that natu-
ral science is not Nature itself but a part of
the relation between Man and Nature, and
therefore is dependent on Man.
— Werner Heisenberg, 1955
There are great rewards in being a new parent. Not least of all is the opportunity to have
a close-up look at a mind in formation. I have been watching my two year old daughter learn
things at a fantastic rate, and though there have been untold numbers of lessons for her,
there have also been a sprinkling for me. For instance, I am just starting to see her come
to grips with the idea that there is a world independent of her desires. What strikes me is
the contrast between this and the concomitant gain in confidence I see grow in her everyday
that there are aspects of existence she actually can control. The two go hand in hand. She
pushes on the world, and sometimes it gives in a way that she has learned to predict, and
sometimes it pushes back in a way she has not foreseen (and may never be able to). If she
could manipulate the world to the complete desires of her will, I am quite sure, there would
be little difference between wake and dream.
But the main point is that she learns from her forays into the world. In my more cynical
moments, I find myself thinking, “How can she think that she’s learned anything at all? She
has no theory of measurement. She leaves measurement completely undefined. How can she
have any true stake to knowledge?”
Hideo Mabuchi once told me, “The quantum measurement problem refers to a set of
people.” And though that is a bit harsh, maybe it also contains a bit of the truth. With the
physics community making use of theories that tend to last between 100 and 300 years, we
are apt to forget that scientific views of the world are built from the top down, not from the
bottom up. The experiment is the basis of all that we know to be firm. But an experiment
is an active intervention into the course of nature on the part of the experimenter; it is not
contemplation of nature from afar [28]. We set up this or that experiment to see how nature
reacts. It is the conjunction of myriads of such interventions and their consequences that we
record into our data books.10
10But I must stress that I am not so positivistic as to think that physics should somehow be grounded on
a primitive notion of “sense impression” as the philosophers of the Vienna Circle did. The interventions and
their consequences that an experimenter records, have no option but to be thoroughly theory-laden. It is
just that, in a sense, they are by necessity at least one theory behind. No one got closer to the salient point
than Heisenberg (in a quote he attributed to Einstein many years after the fact) [29]:
It is quite wrong to try founding a theory on observable magnitudes alone. In reality the very
opposite happens. It is the theory which decides what we can observe. You must appreciate
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We tell ourselves that we have learned something new when we can distill from the data
a compact description of all that was seen and—even more tellingly—when we can dream
up further experiments to corroborate that description. This is the minimal requirement of
science. If, however, from such a description we can further distill a model of a free-standing
“reality” independent of our interventions, then so much the better. I have no bone to pick
with reality. It is the most solid thing we can hope for from a theory.11 Classical physics is
the ultimate example in that regard. It gives us a compact description, but it can give much
more if we want it to.
The important thing to realize, however, is that there is no logical necessity that such a
worldview always be obtainable. If the world is such that we can never identify a reality—
a free-standing reality—independent of our experimental interventions, then we must be
prepared for that too. That is where quantum theory in its most minimal and conceptually
simplest dispensation seems to stand [30]. It is a theory whose terms refer predominately to
our interface with the world. It is a theory that cannot go the extra step that classical physics
did without “writing songs I can’t believe, with words that tear and strain to rhyme” [31].
It is a theory not about observables, not about beables, but about “dingables.” We tap the
bell with our gentle touch and listen for its beautiful ring.
So what are the ways we can intervene on the world? What are the ways we can push it
and wait for its unpredictable reaction? The usual textbook story is that those things that
are measurable correspond to Hermitian operators. Or perhaps to say it in more modern
language, to each observable there corresponds a set of orthogonal projection operators {Πi}
over a complex Hilbert space Hd that form a complete resolution of the identity,∑
i
Πi = I . (1)
The index i labels the potential outcomes of the measurement (or intervention, to slip back
into the language promoted above). When an observer possesses a state of knowledge ρ—
captured most generally by a mixed-state density operator—quantum mechanics dictates
that he can expect the various outcomes with a probability
P (i) = tr(ρΠi) . (2)
that observation is a very complicated process. The phenomenon under observation produces
certain events in our measuring apparatus. As a result, further processes take place in the
apparatus, which eventually and by complicated paths produce sense impressions and help
us to fix the effects in our consciousness. Along this whole path—from the phenomenon to
its fixation in our consciousness—we must be able to tell how nature functions, must know
the natural laws at least in practical terms, before we can claim to have observed anything
at all. Only theory, that is, knowledge of natural laws, enables us to deduce the underlying
phenomena from our sense impressions. When we claim that we can observe something new,
we ought really to be saying that, although we are about to formulate new natural laws that
do not agree with the old ones, we nevertheless assume that the existing laws—covering the
whole path from the phenomenon to our consciousness—function in such a way that we can
rely upon them and hence speak of “observation.”
11Woody Allen said it best: “I hate reality, but, you know, where else can you get a good steak dinner?”
Spending my childhood in Texas, where beef is the staple of most meals, the reader should realize that it
has been no easy journey for me to come to my present view of quantum mechanics!
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The best justification for this probability rule comes by way of Andrew Gleason’s amazing
1957 theorem [16]. For, it states that the standard rule is the only rule that satisfies a
very simple kind of noncontextuality for measurement outcomes [32]. In particular, if one
contemplates measuring two distinct observables {Πi} and {Π˜i} which happen to share a
single projector Πk, then the probability of outcome k is independent of which observable
it is associated with. More formally, the statement is this. Let Pd be the set of projectors
associated with a (real or complex) Hilbert space Hd for d ≥ 3, and let f : Pd −→ [0, 1] be
such that ∑
i
f(Πi) = 1 (3)
whenever a set of projectors {Πi} forms an observable. The theorem concludes that there
exists a density operator ρ such that
f(Π) = tr(ρΠ) . (4)
In fact, in a single blow, Gleason’s theorem derives not only the probability rule, but also the
state-space structure for quantum mechanical states (i.e., that it corresponds to the convex
set of density operators).
In itself this is no small feat, but the thing that makes the theorem an “amazing” theorem
is the shear difficulty required to prove it [33]. Note that no restrictions have been placed
upon the function f beyond the ones mentioned above. There is no assumption that it
need be differentiable, nor that it even need be continuous. All of that, and linearity too,
comes from the structure of the observables—i.e., that they are complete sets of orthogonal
projectors onto a linear vector space.
Nonetheless, one should ask: Does this theorem really give the physicist a clearer vision
of where the probability rule comes from? Astounding feats of mathematics are one thing;
insight into physics is another. The two are often at opposite ends of the spectrum. As for-
tunes turn however, a unifying strand can indeed be drawn by viewing quantum foundations
in the light of quantum information.
The place to start is to drop the fixation that the basic set of observables in quantum
mechanics are complete sets of orthogonal projectors. In quantum information theory it has
been found to be extremely convenient to expand the notion of measurement to also include
general positive operator-valued measures (POVMs) [24, 34]. In other words, in place of the
usual textbook notion of measurement, any set {Eb} of positive-semidefinite operators on
Hd that forms a resolution of the identity, i.e., that satisfies
〈ψ|Eb|ψ〉 ≥ 0 , for all |ψ〉 ∈ Hd (5)
and ∑
b
Eb = I , (6)
counts as a measurement. The outcomes of the measurement are identified with the indices
b, and the probabilities of the outcomes are computed according to a generalized Born rule,
P (b) = tr(ρEb) . (7)
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The set {Eb} is called a POVM, and the operators Eb are called POVM elements. (In the
nonstandard language promoted earlier, the set {Eb} signifies an intervention into nature,
while the individual Eb represent the potential consequences of that intervention.) Unlike
standard measurements, there is no limitation on the number of values the index b can take.
Moreover, the Eb may be of any rank, and there is no requirement that they be mutually
orthogonal.
The way this expansion of the notion of measurement is usually justified is that any
POVM can be represented formally as a standard measurement on an ancillary system that
has interacted in the past with the system of actual interest. Indeed, suppose the system
and ancilla are initially described by the density operators ρS and ρA respectively. The
conjunction of the two systems is then described by the initial quantum state
ρSA = ρS ⊗ ρA . (8)
An interaction between the systems via some unitary time evolution leads to a new state
ρSA −→ UρSAU
† . (9)
Now, imagine a standard measurement on the ancilla. It is described on the total Hilbert
space via a set of orthogonal projection operators {I ⊗Πb}. An outcome b will be found, by
the standard Born rule, with probability
P (b) = tr
(
U(ρS ⊗ ρA)U
†(I ⊗Πb)
)
. (10)
The number of outcomes in this seemingly indirect notion of measurement is limited only by
the dimensionality of the ancilla’s Hilbert space—in principle, there can be arbitrarily many.
As advertised, it turns out that the probability formula above can be expressed in terms
of operators on the system’s Hilbert space alone: This is the origin of the POVM. If we let
|sα〉 and |ac〉 be an orthonormal basis for the system and ancilla respectively, then |sα〉|ac〉
will be a basis for the composite system. Using the cyclic property of the trace in Eq. (10),
we get
P (b) =
∑
αc
〈sα|〈ac|
(
(ρs ⊗ ρA)U
†(I ⊗Πb)U
)
|sα〉|ac〉
=
∑
α
〈sα| ρS
(∑
c
〈ac|
(
(I ⊗ ρA)U
†(I ⊗Πb)U
)
|ac〉
)
|sα〉 . (11)
Letting trA and trS denote partial traces over the system and ancilla, respectively, it follows
that
P (b) = trS(ρSEb) , (12)
where
Eb = trA
(
(I ⊗ ρA)U(I ⊗ Πb)U
†) (13)
is an operator acting on the Hilbert space of the original system. This proves half of what is
needed, but it is also straightforward to go in the reverse direction—i.e., to show that for any
POVM {Eb}, one can pick an ancilla and find operators ρA, U , and Πb such that Eq. (13) is
true.
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Putting this all together, there is a sense in which standard measurements capture ev-
erything that can be said about quantum measurement theory [34]. As became clear above,
a way to think about this is that by learning something about the ancillary system through
a standard measurement, one in turn learns something about the system of real interest.
Indirect though it may seem, this can be a powerful technique, sometimes revealing infor-
mation that could not have been revealed otherwise [35]. A very simple example is where a
sender has only a single qubit available for the sending one of three potential messages. She
therefore has a need to encode the message in one of three preparations of the system, even
though the system is a two-state system. To recover as much information as possible, the
receiver might (just intuitively) like to perform a measurement with three distinct outcomes.
If, however, he were limited to a standard quantum measurement, he would only be able to
obtain two outcomes. This—perhaps surprisingly—generally degrades his opportunities for
recovery.
What I would like to bring up is whether this standard way of justifying the POVM is
the most productive point of view one can take. Might any of the mysteries of quantum
mechanics be alleviated by taking the POVM as a basic notion of measurement? Does the
POVM’s utility portend a larger role for it in the foundations of quantum mechanics?
Standard Generalized
Measurements Measurements
{Πi} {Eb}
〈ψ|Πi|ψ〉 ≥ 0 , ∀|ψ〉 〈ψ|Eb|ψ〉 ≥ 0 , ∀|ψ〉
∑
iΠi = I
∑
bEb = I
P (i) = tr(ρΠi) P (b) = tr(ρEb)
ΠiΠj = δij Πi ———
I try to make the point dramatic in my lectures by exhibiting a transparency of the table
above. On the left-hand side there is a list of various properties for the standard notion of a
quantum measurement. On the right-hand side, there is an almost identical list of properties
for the POVMs. The only difference between the two columns is that the right-hand one
is missing the orthonormality condition required of a standard measurement. The question
I ask the audience is this: Does the addition of that one extra assumption really make the
process of measurement any less mysterious? Indeed, I imagine myself teaching quantum
mechanics for the first time and taking a vote with the best audience of all, the students.12
“Which set of postulates for quantum measurement would you prefer?” I am quite sure they
12I am making the safe bet that they will be lucky enough to not yet be conditioned by years of squabbles
in quantum foundations.
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would respond with a blank stare. But that is the point! It would make no difference to
them, and it should make no difference to us. The only issue worth debating is which notion
of measurement will allow us to see more deeply into quantum mechanics.
Therefore let us pose the question that Gleason did, but with POVMs. In other words, let
us suppose that the sum total of ways an experimenter can intervene on a quantum system
corresponds to the full set of POVMs on its Hilbert space Hd. It is the task of the theory
to give him probabilities for the various consequences of his interventions. Concerning those
probabilities, let us (in analogy to Gleason) assume only that whatever the probability for a
given consequence Ec is, it does not depend upon whether Ec is associated with the POVM
{Eb} or, instead, any other one {E˜b}. This means we can assume there exists a function
f : Ed −→ [0, 1] , (14)
where
Ed =
{
E : 0 ≤ 〈ψ|E|ψ〉 ≤ 1 , ∀ |ψ〉 ∈ Hd
}
, (15)
such that whenever {Eb} forms a POVM,∑
b
f(Eb) = 1 . (16)
(In general, we will call any function satisfying f(E) ≥ 0 and
∑
b f(Eb) = const. a frame
function, in analogy to Gleason’s nonnegative frame functions.)
It will come as no surprise, of course, that a Gleason-like theorem must hold for the
function in Eq. (14). Namely, it can be shown that there must exist a density operator ρ for
which
f(E) = tr(ρE) . (17)
This was recently shown by Paul Busch [14] and, independently, by Joseph Renes and collab-
orators [15]. What is surprising however is the utter simplicity of the proof. Let us exhibit
the whole thing right here and now.
First, consider the case where Hd and the operators on it are defined only over the
field of (complex) rational numbers. It is no problem to see that f is “linear” with
respect to positive combinations of operators that never go outside Ed. For consider
a three-element POVM {E1, E2, E3}. By assumption f(E1) + f(E2) + f(E3) = 1.
However, we can also group the first two elements in this POVM to obtain a new
POVM, and must therefore have f(E1+E2)+ f(E3) = 1. In other words, the function
f must be additive with respect to a fine-graining operation:
f(E1 + E2) = f(E1) + f(E2) . (18)
Similarly for any two integers m and n,
f(E) = mf
(
1
m
E
)
= n f
(
1
n
E
)
(19)
Suppose nm ≤ 1. Then if we write E = nG, this statement becomes:
f
(
n
m
G
)
=
n
m
f(G) . (20)
16
Thus we immediately have a kind of limited linearity on Ed.
One might imagine using this property to cap off the theorem in the following
way. Clearly the full d2-dimensional vector space Od of Hermitian operators on Hd is
spanned by the set Ed since that set contains, among other things, all the projection
operators. Thus, we can write any operator E ∈ Ed as a linear combination
E =
d2∑
i=1
αiEi (21)
for some fixed operator-basis {Ei}
d2
i=1. “Linearity” of f would then give
f(E) =
d2∑
i=1
αif(Ei) . (22)
So, if we define ρ by solving the d2 linear equations
tr(ρEi) = f(Ei) , (23)
we would have
f(E) =
∑
i
αitr(ρEi) = tr
(
ρ
∑
i
αiEi
)
= tr(ρE) (24)
and essentially be done. (Positivity and normalization of f would require ρ to be
an actual density operator.) But the problem is that in expansion (21) there is no
guarantee that the coefficients αi can be chosen so that αiEi ∈ Ed.
What remains to be shown is that f can be extended uniquely to a function that
is truly linear on Od. This too is rather simple. First, take any positive semi-definite
operator E. We can always find a positive rational number g such that E = gG and
G ∈ Ed. Therefore, we can simply define f(E) ≡ gf(G). To see that this definition is
unique, suppose there are two such operators G1 and G2 (with corresponding numbers
g1 and g2) such that E = g1G1 = g2G2. Further suppose g2 ≥ g1. ThenG2 =
g1
g2
G1 and,
by the homogeneity of the original unextended definition of f , we obtain g2f(G2) =
g1f(G1). Furthermore this extension retains the additivity of the original function.
For suppose that neither E nor G, though positive semi-definite, are necessarily in Ed.
We can find a positive rational number c ≥ 1 such that 1c (E +G),
1
cE, and
1
cG are all
in Ed. Then, by the rules we have already obtained,
f(E +G) = c f
(
1
c
(E +G)
)
= c f
(
1
c
E
)
+ c f
(
1
c
G
)
= f(E) + f(G). (25)
Let us now further extend f ’s domain to the full space Od. This can be done by
noting that any operator H can be written as the difference H = E−G of two positive
semi-definite operators. Therefore define f(H) ≡ f(E) − f(G), from which it also
follows that f(−G) = −f(G). To see that this definition is unique suppose there are
four operators E1, E2, G1, and G2, such that H = E1 − G1 = E2 − G2. It follows
that E1 +G2 = E2 +G1. Applying f (as extended in the previous paragraph) to this
equation, we obtain f(E1) + f(G2) = f(E2) + f(G1) so that f(E1)− f(G1) = f(E2)−
f(G2). Finally, with this new extension, full linearity can be checked immediately.
This completes the proof as far as the (complex) rational number field is concerned:
Because f extends uniquely to a linear functional on Od, we can indeed go through the
steps of Eqs. (21) through (24) without worry.
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There are two things that are significant about this much of the proof. First, in contrast to
Gleason’s original theorem, there is nothing to bar the same logic from working when d = 2.
This is quite nice because much of the community has gotten in the habit of thinking that
there is nothing particularly “quantum mechanical” about a single qubit. Indeed, because
orthogonal projectors on H2 can be mapped onto antipodes of the Bloch sphere, it is known
that the measurement-outcome statistics for any standard measurement can be mocked-up
through a noncontextual hidden-variable theory. What this result shows is that that simply
is not the case when one considers the full set of POVMs as one’s potential measurements.
The other important thing is that the theorem works for Hilbert spaces over the rational
number field: one does not need to invoke the full power of the continuum. This contrasts
with the surprising result of Meyer [36] that the standard Gleason theorem fails in such
a setting. The present theorem hints at a kind of resiliency to the structure of quantum
mechanics that falls through the mesh of the standard Gleason result: The probability rule
for POVMs does not actually depend so much upon the detailed workings of the number
field.
The final step of the proof, indeed, is to show that nothing goes awry when we go the
extra step of reinstating the continuum.
In other words, we need to show that the function f (now defined on the set Ed
complex operators) is a continuous function. This comes about in simple way
from f ’s additivity. Suppose for two positive semi-definite operators E and G
that E ≤ G (i.e., G − E is positive semi-definite). Then trivially there exists a
positive semi-definite operator H such that E +H = G and through which the
additivity of f gives f(E) ≤ f(G). Let c be an irrational number, and let an
be an increasing sequence and bn a decreasing sequence of rational numbers that
both converge to c. It follows for any positive semi-definite operator E, that
f(anE) ≤ f(cE) ≤ f(bnE) , (26)
which implies
anf(E) ≤ f(cE) ≤ bnf(E) . (27)
Since lim anf(E) and lim bnf(E) are identical, by the “pinching theorem” of
elementary calculus, they must equal f(cE). This establishes that we can con-
sistently define
f(cE) = cf(E) . (28)
Reworking the extensions of f in the last inset (but with this enlarged notion of
homogeneity), one completes the proof in a straightforward manner.
Of course we are not getting something from nothing. The reason the present derivation is
so easy in contrast to the standard proof is that mathematically the assumption of POVMs
as the basic notion of measurement is significantly stronger than the usual assumption.
Physically, though, I would say it is just the opposite. Why add extra restrictions to the
notion of measurement when they only make the route from basic assumption to practical
usage more circuitous than it need be?
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Still, no assumption should be left unanalyzed if it stands a chance of bearing fruit.
Indeed, one can ask what is so very compelling about the noncontextuality property (of
probability assignments) that both Gleason’s original theorem and the present version make
use of. Given the picture of measurement as a kind of invasive intervention into the world,
one might expect the very opposite. One is left wondering why measurement probabilities
do not depend upon the whole context of the measurement interaction. Why is p(b) not of
the form f(b, {Ec})? Is there any precedent for the usual assumption?
5 Whither Bayes’ Rule?
And so you see I have come to doubt
All that I once held as true
I stand alone without beliefs
The only truth I know is you.
— Paul Simon, Kathy’s Song
Quantum states are states of knowledge, not states of nature. That statement is the
cornerstone of this paper. Thus, in searching to make sense of the remainder of quantum
mechanics, one strategy ought to be to seek guidance [37] from the most developed avenue of
“knowledge theory” to date—Bayesian probability theory [38, 39, 40]. Indeed, the very aim
of Bayesian theory is to develop reliable methods of reasoning and making decisions in the
light of incomplete knowledge. To what extent does that structure mesh with the seemingly
independent structure of quantum mechanics? To what extent are there analogies; to what
extent distinctions?
This section is about turning a distinction into an analogy. The core of the matter is
the manner in which states of knowledge are updated in the two theories. At first sight,
they appear to be quite different in character. To see this, let us first explore how quantum
mechanical states change when information is gathered.
In older accounts of quantum mechanics, one often encounters the “collapse postulate”
as a basic statement of the theory. One hears things like, “Axiom 5: Upon the completion
of a measurement of a Hermitian observable H , the system is left in an eigenstate of H .” In
quantum information, however, it has become clear that it is useful to broaden the notion
of measurement, and with it, the analysis of how a state can change in the process. The
foremost reason for this is that the collapse postulate is simply not true in general: Depending
upon the exact nature of the measurement interaction, there may be any of a large set of
possibilities for the final state of a system.
The broadest (consistent) notion of state change arose in the theory of “effects and
operations” [34]. The statement is this. Suppose one’s initial state for a quantum system is
a density operator ρ, and a POVM {Eb} is measured on that system. Then, according to
this formalism, the state after the measurement can be any state ρb of the form
ρb =
1
tr(ρEb)
∑
i
AbiρA
†
bi , (29)
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where ∑
i
A†biAbi = Eb . (30)
Note the immense generality of this formula. There is no constraint on the number of indices
i in the Abi and these operators need not even be Hermitian.
The usual justification for this kind of generality—just as in the case of the commonplace
justification for the POVM formalism—comes about by imagining that the measurement
arises in an indirect fashion rather than as a direct attack. In other words, the primary
system is pictured to interact with an ancilla first, and only then subjected to a “real”
measurement on the ancilla alone. The trick is that one posits a kind of projection postulate
on the primary system due to this process. This assumption has a much safer feel than the
raw projection postulate since, after the interaction, no measurement on the ancilla should
cause a physical perturbation to the primary system.
More formally, we can start out by following Eqs. (8) and (9), but in place of Eq. (10) we
must make an assumption on how the system’s state changes. For this one invokes a kind
of “projection-postulate-at-a-distance.”13 Namely, one takes
ρb =
1
P (b)
trA
(
(I ⊗ Πb)U(ρS ⊗ ρA)U
†(I ⊗ Πb)
)
. (31)
The reason for invoking the partial trace is to make sure that any hint of a state change for
the ancilla remains unaddressed.
To see how expression (31) makes connection to Eq. (29), denote the eigenvalues and
eigenvectors of ρA by λα and |aα〉 respectively. Then ρS ⊗ ρA can be written as
ρS ⊗ ρA =
∑
α
√
λα |aα〉ρS〈aα|
√
λα , (32)
and, expanding Eq. (31), we have
ρb =
1
P (b)
∑
β
〈aβ|(I ⊗ Πb)U
†(ρS ⊗ ρA)U(I ⊗Πb)|aβ〉
=
1
P (b)
∑
αβ
(√
λα 〈aβ|(I ⊗Πb)U
†|aα〉
)
ρS
(
〈aα|U(I ⊗ Πb)|aβ〉
√
λα
)
. (33)
A representation of the form in Eq. (29) can be made by taking
Abαβ =
√
λα 〈aα|U(I ⊗ Πb)|aβ〉 (34)
and lumping the two indices α and β into the single index i. Indeed, one can easily check
that Eq. (30) holds.14 This completes what we had set out to show. However, just as with
the case of the POVM {Eb}, one can always find a way to reverse engineer the derivation:
13David Mermin has also recently emphasized this point in Ref. [41].
14As an aside, it should be clear from the construction in Eq. (34) that there are many equally good
representations of ρb. For a precise statement of the latitude of this freedom, see Ref. [42].
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Given a set of Abi, one can always find a U , a ρA, and set of Πb such that Eq. (31) becomes
true.
Of course the old collapse postulate is contained within the extended formalism as a
special case: There, one just takes both sets {Eb} and {Abi = Eb} to be sets of orthogonal
projectors. Let us take a moment to think about this special case in isolation. What is
distinctive about it is that it captures in the extreme a common folklore associated with the
measurement process. For it tends to convey the image that measurement is a kind of gut
wrenching violence: In one moment the state is a ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, while in the very next it is a
Πi = |i〉〈i|. Moreover, such a wild transition need depend upon no details of |ψ〉 and |i〉; in
particular the two states may even be almost orthogonal to each other. In density-operator
language, there is no sense in which Πi is contained in ρ: the two states are simply in distinct
places of the operator space.
Contrast this with the description of information gathering that arises in Bayesian prob-
ability theory. There, an initial state of knowledge is captured by a probability distribution
p(h) for some hypothesis H . The way gathering a piece of data d is taken into account in
assigning one’s new state of knowledge is through Bayes’ conditionalization rule. That is to
say, one expands p(h) in terms of the relevant joint probability distribution and picks off the
appropriate term:
p(h) =
∑
d
p(h, d)
=
∑
d
p(d)p(h|d) (35)
↓
p(h)
d
−→ p(h|d) , (36)
where p(h|d) satisfies the tautology
p(h|d) =
p(h, d)
p(d)
. (37)
How gentle this looks in comparison to quantum collapse! When one gathers new informa-
tion, one simply refines one’s old knowledge in the most literal of senses. It is not as if the
new state is incommensurable with the old. It was always there; it was just initially averaged
in with various other potential states of knowledge.
Why does quantum collapse not look more like Bayes’ rule? Is quantum collapse really
a more violent kind of change, or might it be an artifact of a problematic representation?
By this stage, it should come as no surprise to the reader that dropping the ancilla from our
image of generalized measurements will be the first step to progress. Taking the transition
from ρ to ρb in Eqs. (29) and (30) as the basic statement of what quantum measurement is
is a good starting point.
To accentuate a similarity between Eq. (29) and Bayes’ rule, let us first contemplate cases
of it where the index i takes on a single value. Then, we can conveniently drop that index
and write
ρb =
1
P (b)
AbρA
†
b , (38)
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where
Eb = A
†
bAb . (39)
In a loose way, one can say that measurements of this sort are the most efficient they can
be for a given POVM {Eb}: For, a measurement interaction with an explicit i-dependence
may be viewed as “more truly” a measurement of a finer-grained POVM that just happens
to throw away some of the information it gained. Let us make this point more precise.
Notice that Bayes’ rule has the property that one’s uncertainty about a hypothesis can be
expected to decrease upon the acquisition of data. This can be made rigorous, for instance,
by gauging uncertainty with the Shannon entropy function [43],
S(H) = −
∑
h
p(h) log p(h) . (40)
This number is bounded between 0 and the logarithm of the number of hypotheses in H , and
there are several reasons to think of it as a good measure of uncertainty. Perhaps the most
important of these is that it quantifies the number of YES-NO questions one can expect to
ask per instance of H , if one’s only means to ascertain the outcome is from a colleague who
knows the actual result [44]. Under this quantification, the lower the Shannon entropy, the
more predictable a measurement’s outcomes.
Because the function f(x) = −x log x is concave on the interval [0, 1], it follows that,
S(H) = −
∑
h
(∑
d
p(d)p(h|d)
)
log
(∑
d
p(d)p(h|d)
)
≥ −
∑
d
p(d)
∑
h
p(h|d) log p(h|d) .
=
∑
d
p(d)S(H|d)
≡ S(H|D) . (41)
Indeed we hope to find a similar statement for how the result of efficient quantum mea-
surements decrease uncertainty or impredictability. But, what can be meant by a decrease
of uncertainty through quantum measurement? I have argued strenuously that the informa-
tion gain in a measurement cannot be information about a preexisting reality. The way out
of the impasse is simple: The uncertainty that decreases in quantum measurement is the
uncertainty one expects for the results of potential future measurements.
There are at least two ways of quantifying this that are worthy of note. The first has to
do with the von Neumann entropy of a density operator ρ:
S(ρ) = −tr ρ log ρ = −
d∑
k=1
λk log λk , (42)
where the λk signify the eigenvalues of ρ. (We use the convention that λ log λ = 0 whenever
λ = 0 so that S(ρ) is always well defined.)
The intuitive meaning of the von Neumann entropy can be found by first thinking about
the Shannon entropy. Consider any standard measurement P consisting of d one-dimensional
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orthogonal projectors Πi. The Shannon entropy for the outcomes of this measurement is
given by
H(P) = −
d∑
i=1
(trρΠi) log (trρΠi) . (43)
A natural question to ask is: With respect to a given density operator ρ, which measurement
P will give the most predictability over its outcomes? As it turns out, the answer is any
P that forms a set of eigenprojectors for ρ [45]. When this obtains, the Shannon entropy
of the measurement outcomes reduces to simply the von Neumann entropy of the density
operator. The von Neumann entropy, then, signifies the amount of impredictability one
achieves by way of a standard measurement in a best case scenario. Indeed, true to one’s
intuition, one has the most knowledge by this account when ρ is a pure state—for then
S(ρ) = 0. Alternatively, one has the least knowledge when ρ is proportional to the identity
operator—for then any measurement P will have outcomes that are all equally likely.
The best case scenario for predictability, however, is a limited case, and not very indicative
of the density operator as a whole. Since the density operator contains, in principle, all that
can be said about every possible measurement, it seems a shame to throw away the vast part
of that information in our considerations.
This leads to a second method for quantifying uncertainty in the quantum setting. For
this, we again rely on the Shannon information as our basic notion of impredictability. The
difference is we evaluate it with respect to a “typical” measurement rather than the best
possible one. But typical with respect to what? The notion of typical is only defined with
respect to a given measure on the set of measurements.
Regardless, there is a fairly canonical answer. There is a unique measure dΩΠ on the
space of one-dimensional projectors that is invariant with respect to all unitary operations.
That in turn induces a canonical measure dΩP on the space of von Neumann measurements
P [46]. Using this measure leads to the following quantity
S(ρ) =
∫
H(Π) dΩP
= −d
∫
(trρΠ) log (trρΠ) dΩΠ , (44)
which is intimately connected to the so-called quantum “subentropy” of Ref. [47]. This
mean entropy can be evaluated explicitly in terms of the eigenvalues of ρ and takes on the
expression
S(ρ) =
1
ln 2
(
1
2
+
1
3
+ · · ·+
1
d
)
+Q(ρ) (45)
where the subentropy Q(ρ) is defined by
Q(ρ) = −
d∑
k=1

∏
i 6=k
λk
λk − λi

λk log λk . (46)
In the case where ρ has degenerate eigenvalues, λl = λm for l 6= m, one need only reset them
to λl + ǫ and λm − ǫ and consider the limit as ǫ → 0. The limit is convergent and hence
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Q(ρ) is finite for all ρ. With this, one can also see that for a pure state ρ, Q(ρ) vanishes.
Furthermore, since S(ρ) is bounded above by log d, we know that
0 ≤ Q(ρ) ≤ log d−
1
ln 2
(
1
2
+ · · ·+
1
d
)
≤
1− γ
ln 2
, (47)
where γ is Euler’s constant. This means that for any ρ, Q(ρ) never exceeds approximately
0.60995 bits.
The interpretation of this result is the following. Even when one has maximal information
about a quantum system—i.e., one has a pure state for it—one can predict almost nothing
about the outcome of a typical measurement [25]. In the limit of large d, the outcome entropy
for a typical measurement is just a little over a half bit away from its maximal value. Having
a mixed state for a system, reduces one’s predictability even further, but indeed not by
that much: The small deviation is captured by the function in Eq. (46), which becomes a
quantification of uncertainty in its own right.
The way to get at a quantum statement of Eq. (41) is to make use of the fact that S(ρ)
and Q(ρ) are both concave in the variable ρ [48]. That is, for either function, we have
F (tρ0 + (1− t)ρ1) ≥ tF (ρ0) + (1− t)F (ρ1) , (48)
for any density operators ρ0 and ρ1 and any real number t ∈ [0, 1]. However, the result does
not arise in the trivial fashion it did for classical case of Eq. (41). This is because generally,
as already emphasized,
ρ 6=
∑
b
P (b)ρb (49)
for ρb defined as in Eq. (38). One must be slightly more roundabout.
The key is in noticing that
ρ = ρ1/2Iρ1/2
=
∑
b
ρ1/2Ebρ
1/2
=
∑
b
P (b)ρ˜b (50)
where
ρ˜b =
1
P (b)
ρ1/2Ebρ
1/2 =
1
P (b)
ρ1/2A†bAbρ
1/2 . (51)
What is special about this decomposition of ρ is that for each b, ρb and ρ˜b have the same
eigenvalues. This follows since X†X and XX† have the same eigenvalues, for any operator
X . In the present case, setting X = Abρ
1/2 does the trick. Using the fact that both S(ρ)
and Q(ρ) depend only upon the eigenvalues of ρ we obtain:
S(ρ) ≥
∑
b
P (b)S(ρb) (52)
Q(ρ) ≥
∑
b
P (b)Q(ρb) , (53)
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as we had been hoping for. Thus, in performing an efficient quantum measurement of a
POVM {Eb}, an observer can expect to be left with less uncertainty than he started with.
15
In this sense, quantum “collapse” does indeed have some of the flavor of Bayes’ rule. But
we can expect more, and the derivation above hints at just the right ingredient: ρb and ρ˜b
have the same eigenvalues! To see the impact of this, let us once again explore the content
of Eqs. (38) and (39). A common way to describe their meaning is to use the operator
polar-decomposition theorem [50] to rewrite Eq. (38) in the form
ρb =
1
P (b)
UbE
1/2
b ρE
1/2
b U
†
b , (54)
where Ub is a unitary operator. Since—subject only to the constraint of efficiency—the
operators Ab are not determined any further than Eq. (39), Ub can be any unitary operator
whatsoever. Thus, a customary way of thinking of the state-change process is to break it up
into two conceptual pieces. First there is a “raw collapse”:
ρ −→ σb =
1
P (b)
E
1/2
b ρE
1/2
b . (55)
Then, subject to the details of the measurement interaction and the particular outcome b,
one imagines the measuring device enforcing a further kind of “feedback” on the measured
system:
σb −→ ρb = UbσbU
†
b . (56)
But this break down of the transition is a purely conceptual game.
Since the Ub are arbitrary to begin with, we might as well break down the state-change
process into the following (nonstandard) conceptual components. First one imagines an
observer refining his initial state of knowledge and simply plucking out a term corresponding
to the “data” collected:
ρ =
∑
b
P (b)ρ˜b (57)
↓
ρ
b
−→ ρ˜b . (58)
Finally, there may be a further “mental readjustment” of the observer’s knowledge, taking
into account details both of the measurement interaction and the observer’s initial state of
knowledge. This is enacted via some (formal) unitary operation Vb:
ρ˜b −→ ρb = Vbρ˜bV
†
b . (59)
Putting the two processes together, one has the same result as the usual picture.
The resemblance between the process in Eq. (58) and the classical Bayes’ rule of Eq. (36)
is unmistakable.16 By this way of viewing things, quantum collapse is indeed not such a
15By differing methods, a strengthening of this result in terms of a majorization property can be found in
Refs. [48] and [49].
16Earlier allusions to a resemblance between quantum collapse and Bayes’ rule can be found in Ref. [51].
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violent state of affairs after all. Quantum measurement is nothing more, and nothing less,
than a refinement and a readjustment of one’s state of knowledge. More general state changes
of the form Eq. (29) come about similarly, but with a further step of coarse-graining (i.e.,
throwing away information that was in principle accessible).
Let us look at two limiting cases of efficient measurements. In the first, we imagine an
observer whose initial state of knowledge ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| is a maximal state of knowledge. By
this account, no measurement whatsoever can refine that state of knowledge. This follows
because, no matter what {Eb} is,
ρ1/2Ebρ
1/2 = P (b)|ψ〉〈ψ| . (60)
The only state change that can come about from such a measurement must be purely of the
“mental readjustment” sort: We learn nothing new; we just change what we can predict as
a consequence of experimental intervention. In particular, when the POVM is an orthogonal
set of projectors {Πi = |i〉〈i|} and the state-change mechanism is the von Neumann collapse
postulate, this simply corresponds to a readjustment according to the unitary operators
Ui = |i〉〈ψ| . (61)
At the opposite end of things, we can contemplate measurements that have no causal
connection at all to the system being measured. This could come about, for instance, by
interacting with one side of an entangled pair of systems and using the consequence of
that intervention to update one’s knowledge about the other side. In such a case, one
can show that the state change is purely of the refinement variety (with no further mental
readjustment). For instance, consider a pure state |ψAB〉 whose Schmidt decomposition takes
the form
|ψAB〉 =
∑
i
√
λi|ai〉|bi〉 . (62)
An efficient measurement on the A side of this leads to a state update of the form
|ψAB〉〈ψAB| −→ (Ab ⊗ I)|ψ
AB〉〈ψAB|(A†b ⊗ I) . (63)
Tracing out the A side, then gives
trA
(
Ab ⊗ I|ψ
AB〉〈ψAB|A†b ⊗ I
)
=
∑
ijk
√
λj
√
λk〈ai|Ab ⊗ I|aj〉|bj〉〈ak|〈bk|A
†
b ⊗ I|ai〉
=
∑
ijk
√
λj
√
λk〈ak|A
†
b|ai〉〈ai|Ab|aj〉|bj〉〈bk|
=
∑
jk
√
λj
√
λk〈ak|A
†
bAb|aj〉|bj〉〈bk|
=
∑
jk
√
λj
√
λk〈bk|UA
†
bAbU
†|bj〉|bj〉〈bk|
=
∑
jk
√
λj
√
λk〈bj |
(
UA†bAbU
†)T|bk〉|bj〉〈bk|
= ρ1/2
(
UA†bAbU
†)Tρ1/2 (64)
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where ρ is the initial quantum state on the B side, U is the unitary operator connecting the
|ai〉 basis to the |bi〉 basis, and
T represents taking a transpose with respect to the |bi〉 basis.
Since the operators
Fb =
(
UA†bAbU
†)T (65)
go together to form a POVM, we indeed have the claimed result.
In summary, the lesson here is that it turns out to be rather easy to think of quantum
collapse as a noncommutative variant of Bayes’ rule. In fact it is just in this that one starts
to get a feel for (at least) a partial reason for Gleason’s noncontextuality assumption. In
the setting of classical Bayes’ conditionalization we have just that: The probability of the
transition p(h) −→ p(h|d) is governed solely by the local probability p(d). The transition
does not care about how we have partitioned the rest of the potential transitions. That
is, it does not care whether d is embedded in a two outcome set {d,¬d} or whether it is
embedded in a three outcome set, {d, e,¬(d ∨ e)}, etc. Similarly with the quantum case.
The probability for a transition from ρ to ρ0 cares not whether our refinement is of the form
ρ = P (0)ρ0 +
17∑
b=1
P (b)ρb or of the form ρ = P (0)ρ0 + P (18)ρ18 , (66)
as long as
P (18)ρ18 =
17∑
b=1
P (b)ρb (67)
What could be a simpler generalization of Bayes’ rule?
Indeed, leaning on that, we can restate the discussion of the “measurement problem” at
the beginning of Section 4 in slightly more technical terms. Go back to the classical setting
of Eqs. (35) and (37) where an agent has a probability distribution p(h, d) over two sets of
hypotheses. Marginalizing over the possibilities for d, one obtains the agent’s initial state of
knowledge p(h) for the hypothesis h. If he gathers an explicit piece of data d, he should use
Bayes’ rule to update his knowledge about h to p(h|d).
The question is this: Is the transition
p(h) −→ p(h|d) (68)
a mystery we should contend with? If someone asked for a physical description of that
transition, would we be able to give an explanation? After all, one value for h is true and
always remains true: there is no transition in it. One value for d is true and always remains
true: there is no transition in it. The only transition is in the knowledge p(h). To put the
issue into perspective for the quantum measurement problem, let us ask: Should we not have
a detailed theory of how the brain works before we can trust in the validity of Bayes’ rule?
The answer is, “Of course not!” Bayes’ rule, and with it all of probability theory, is
an intellectual construct that stands beyond the details of physics. George Boole called
probability theory a law of thought [52]. Its calculus specifies the optimal way an agent
should reason and make decisions when faced with incomplete information. In this way,
probability theory is but a generalization of Aristotelian logic17—a construct very few would
17In addition to Ref. [39], many further materials concerning this point of view can be downloaded
from the Probability Theory As Extended Logic web site maintained by G. L. Bretthorst, http://bayes.
wustl.edu/.
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accept as being tied to the explicit details of the physical world.18
The formal similarities between Bayes’ rule and quantum collapse may be telling us how
to finally cut the Gordian knot of the measurement problem. Namely, it may be telling us
that it is simply not a problem at all! Indeed, drawing on the analogies between the two
theories, one is left with a spark of insight: perhaps the better part of quantum mechanics is
simply “law of thought” [53]. Perhaps the structure of the theory denotes the optimal way
to reason and make decisions in light of some fundamental situation, waiting to be ferreted
out in a more satisfactory fashion.
This much we know: That “fundamental situation”—whatever it is—must be an ingre-
dient Bayesian probability theory does not have. There must be something to drive a wedge
between the two theories. Probability theory alone is too general of a structure. Narrowing
it will require input from the world about us.
6 Wither Entanglement?
When two systems, of which we know the states
by their respective representatives, enter into tempo-
rary physical interaction due to known forces between
them, and when after a time of mutual influence the
systems separate again, then they can no longer be
described in the same way as before, viz. by endowing
each of them with a representative of its own. I would
not call that one but rather the characteristic trait
of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its en-
tire departure from classical lines of thought. By the
interaction the two representatives (or ψ-functions)
have become entangled.
— Erwin Schro¨dinger, 1935
Quantum entanglement certainly gets a load of airplay these days. By most accounts it
is the main ingredient in quantum information theory and quantum computing [54], and it
is the main mystery of the quantum foundations [55]. But what is it? Where does it come
from?
The predominant purpose it has served in this paper has been as a kind of background.
For it, more than any other ingredient in quantum mechanics, has clinched the issue of
“information about what?” in the author’s mind: That information cannot be about a
preexisting reality (a hidden variable) unless we are willing to renege on our very reason for
rejecting the quantum state’s objective reality in the first place. What I am alluding to here
is the conjunction of the Einstein argument reported in Section 3 and the phenomena of the
Bell inequality violations by quantum mechanics. Putting those points together gave us that
the information symbolized by a |ψ〉 must be information about the potential consequences
of our interventions into the world.
18We have, after all, used simple Aristotelian logic in making deductions from all our physical theories to
date: from Aristotle’s physics to quantum mechanics to general relativity and even string theory.
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But, now I would like to turn the tables and ask whether the structure of our potential
interventions—the POVMs—can tell us something about the origin of entanglement. Could
it be that the concept of entanglement is just a minor addition to the much deeper point
that measurements correspond to refinements of density operators (i.e., the substance of the
two preceding sections)?
The technical translation of this question is, why do we combine systems according to
the tensor product rule? There are certainly innumerable ways to combine two Hilbert
spaces HA and HB to obtain a third HAB. We could take the direct sum of the two spaces
HAB = HA⊕HB. We could take their Grassmann product HAB = HA ∧HB [56]. We could
take scads of other things. But instead we take their tensor product,
HAB = HA ⊗HB . (69)
Why?
Could it arise from the selfsame considerations we have already made our mainstay—
from a noncontextuality property for measurement-outcome probabilities? The answer is
yes, and the theorem I am about demonstrate owes much in inspiration to Ref. [57].
Here is the scenario. Suppose we have two quantum systems, and we can make a mea-
surement on each.19 On the first, we can measure any POVM on the dA-dimensional Hilbert
space HA; on the second, we can measure any POVM on the dB-dimensional Hilbert space
HB. Moreover, suppose we may condition the second measurement on the nature and the
outcome of the first, and vice versa. That is to say—walking from A to B—we could first
measure {Ei} on A, and then, depending on the outcome i, measure {F
i
j} on B. Similarly—
walking from B to A—we could first measure {Fj} on B, and then, depending on the outcome
j, measure {Eji } on A. So that we have valid POVMs, we must have∑
i
Ei = I and
∑
j
F ij = I ∀ i , (70)
and ∑
i
Eji = I ∀ j and
∑
j
Fj = I , (71)
for these sets of operators. Let us denote by Sij an ordered pair of operators, either of the
form (Ei, F
i
j ) or of the form (E
j
i , Fj), as appearing above. Let us call a set of such operators
{Sij} a locally-measurable POVM tree.
Suppose now that—just as with the POVM-version of Gleason’s theorem in Section 4—
the joint probability P (i, j) for the outcomes of such a measurement should not depend upon
which tree Sij is embedded in: This is essentially the same assumption we made there, but
now applied to local measurements on the separate systems. In other words, let us suppose
there exists a function
f : EdA × EdB −→ [0, 1] (72)
such that ∑
ij
f(Sij) = 1 (73)
19This, one might think, is the very essence of having two systems rather than one—that we can probe
them independently.
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whenever the Sij satisfy either Eq. (70) or Eq. (71).
Note in particular that Eq. (72) makes no use of the tensor product: The domain of f is
the Cartesian product of the two sets EdA and EdB . The notion of a local measurement on
the separate systems is enforced by the requirement that the ordered pairs Sij satisfy the
side conditions of Eqs. (70) and (71). This, of course, is not the most general kind of local
measurement one can imagine—more sophisticated measurements could involve multiple
ping-pongings between A and B as in Ref. [58]—but the present restricted class is already
sufficient for fixing the probability rule for local measurements.
The theorem is this: If f satisfies Eqs. (72) and (73) for all locally-measurable POVM
trees, then there exists a density operator ρ˜ on HA ⊗HB such that
f(E, F ) = tr
(
ρ˜(E ⊗ F )
)
. (74)
If HA and HB are defined over the field of complex numbers, then ρ˜ is unique. Uniqueness
does not hold, however, if the underlying field is the real numbers.
The proof of this statement is almost a trivial extension of the proof in Section 4. One
again starts by showing additivity, but this time in the two variables E and F separately.
For instance, for a fixed E ∈ EdA, define
gE(F ) = f(E, F ) , (75)
and consider two locally-measurable POVM trees
{(I − E, Fi), (E,Gα)} and {(I − E, Fi), (E,Hβ)} , (76)
where {Fi}, {Gα}, and {Hβ} are arbitrary POVMs on HB. Then Eq. (73) requires that∑
i
gI-E(Fi) +
∑
α
gE(Gα) = 1 (77)
and ∑
i
gI-E(Fi) +
∑
β
gE(Hβ) = 1 . (78)
From this it follows that,
∑
α
gE(Gα) =
∑
β
gE(Hβ) = const. (79)
That is to say, gE(F ) is a frame function in the sense of Section 4. Consequently, we know
that we can use the same methods as there to uniquely extend gE(F ) to a linear functional
on the complete set of Hermitian operators on HB. Similarly, for fixed F ∈ EdB, we can
define
hF (E) = f(E, F ) , (80)
and prove that this function too can be uniquely extended to a linear functional on the
Hermitian operators on HA.
The linear extensions of gE(F ) and hF (E) can be put together in a simple way to give
a full bilinear extension to the function f(E, F ). Namely, for any two Hermitian operators
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A and B on HA and HB, respectively, let A = α1E1 − α2E2 and B = β1F1 − β2F2 be
decompositions such that α1, α2, β1, β2 ≥ 0, E1, E2 ∈ EdA , and F1, F2 ∈ EdB . Then define
f(A,B) ≡ α1gE1(B)− α2gE2(B) . (81)
To see that this definition is unique, take any other decomposition A = α˜1E˜1 − α˜2E˜2. Then
we have
f(A,B) = α˜1gE˜1(B)− α˜2gE˜2(B)
= α˜1f(E˜1, B)− α˜2f(E˜2, B)
= β1
(
α˜1f(E˜1, F1)− α˜2f(E˜1, F1)
)
− β2
(
α˜1f(E˜1, F2)− α˜2f(E˜2, F2)
)
= β1hF1(A)− β2hF2(A)
= β1
(
α1f(E1, F1)− α2f(E1, F1)
)
− β2
(
α1f(E1, F2)− α2f(E2, F2)
)
= α1f(E1, B)− α2f(E2, B)
= α1gE1(B)− α2gE2(B) , (82)
which is as desired.
With bilinearity for the function f established, we have essentially the full story [56, 59].
For, let {Ei}, i = 1, . . . , d
2
A, be a complete basis for the Hermitian operators on HA and let
{Fj}, j = 1, . . . , d
2
B, be a complete basis for the Hermitian operators on HB. If E =
∑
i αiEi
and F =
∑
j βjFj , then
f(E, F ) =
∑
ij
αiβjf(Ei, Fj) . (83)
Define ρ˜ to be a linear operator on HA ⊗HB satisfying the (dAdB)
2 linear equations
tr
(
ρ˜(Ei ⊗ Fj)
)
= f(Ei, Fj) . (84)
Such an operator always exists. Consequently we have,
f(E, F ) =
∑
ij
αiβjtr
(
ρ˜(Ei ⊗ Fj)
)
= tr
(
ρ˜(E ⊗ F )
)
. (85)
Enforcing positivity and normalization for the function f proves the main point of the
theorem.
For complex Hilbert spaces HA and HB, the uniqueness of ρ˜ comes about because the set
{Ei⊗Fj} forms a complete basis for the Hermitian operators on HA⊗HB. For real Hilbert
spaces, however, the analog of the Hermitian operators are the symmetric operators. The
dimensionality of the space of symmetric operators on a real Hilbert space Hd is
1
2
d(d+ 1),
rather than the d2 it is for the complex case. This means that in the steps above only
1
4
dAdB(dA + 1)(dB + 1) (86)
equations will appear in Eq. (84), whereas
1
2
dAdB(dAdB + 1) (87)
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are needed to uniquely specify a ρ˜. For instance take dA = dB = 2. Then Eq. (86) gives nine
equations, while Eq. (87) requires ten.
Let us emphasize the striking feature of this way of deriving the tensor product rule for
combining separate quantum systems: It is built on the very concept of local measurement.
There is nothing “spooky” or “nonlocal” about it; there is nothing in it resembling “passion
at a distance” [61]. Indeed, one need not even consider probability assignments for the
outcomes of measurements of the “nonlocality without entanglement” variety [58] in order
to uniquely fix the probability rule. That is—to give an example on H3⊗H3—one need not
consider standard measurements like {Eb = |ψb〉〈ψb|}, where
|ψ1〉 = |1〉|1〉
|ψ2〉 = |0〉|0 + 1〉 |ψ6〉 = |1 + 2〉|0〉
|ψ3〉 = |0〉|0− 1〉 |ψ7〉 = |1− 2〉|0〉 (88)
|ψ4〉 = |2〉|1 + 2〉 |ψ8〉 = |0 + 1〉|2〉
|ψ5〉 = |2〉|1− 2〉 |ψ9〉 = |0− 1〉|2〉
with |0〉, |1〉, and |2〉 forming an orthonormal basis on H3, and |0 + 1〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), etc.
This is a measurement that takes neither the form of Eq. (70) nor (71). It stands out instead
in that, even though all its POVM elements are tensor product operators—i.e., they have no
quantum entanglement—it still cannot be measured by local means, even with the elaborate
ping-ponging strategies mentioned earlier.
Thus, the tensor product rule, and with it quantum entanglement, seems to be more a
statement of locality than anything else. It, like the probability rule, is more a product of
the structure of the observables—that they are POVMs—combined with noncontextuality.
In searching for the secret ingredient to drive a wedge between general Bayesian probability
theory and quantum mechanics, it seems that the direction not to look is toward quantum
entanglement. Perhaps the trick instead is to dig deeper into the Bayesian toolbox.
7 Unknown Quantum States?
My thesis, paradoxically, and a little provocatively,
but nonetheless genuinely, is simply this:
QUANTUM STATES DO NOT EXIST.
The abandonment of superstitious beliefs about the
existence of Phlogiston, the Cosmic Ether, Absolute
Space and Time, ..., or Fairies and Witches, was an
essential step along the road to scientific thinking.
The quantum state, too, if regarded as something en-
dowed with some kind of objective existence, is no
less a misleading conception, an illusory attempt to
exteriorize or materialize the information we possess.
— the ghost of Bruno de Finetti
The hint of a more fruitful direction can be found by trying to make sense of one of the
most commonly used phrases in quantum information theory. It is the unknown quantum
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ψ? !
Figure 1: What can the term “unknown state” mean if quantum states are taken exclusively to
be states of knowledge rather than states of nature? When we say that a system has an unknown
state, must we always imagine a further observer whose state of knowledge is symbolized by some
|ψ〉, and it is the identity of the symbol that we are ignorant of?
state. There is hardly a paper in quantum information that does not make use of it. Unknown
quantum states are teleported [8], protected with quantum error correcting codes [62], and
used to check for quantum eavesdropping [63]. The list of uses grows each day. But what
can the term possibly mean? In an information-based interpretation of quantum mechanics,
it is an overt oxymoron: If quantum states, by their very definition, are states of knowledge
and not states of nature, then the state is known by someone—at the very least, by the
person who wrote it down.
Thus, if a phenomenon ostensibly invokes the concept of an unknown state in its formu-
lation, that unknown state had better be shorthand for a more basic situation (even if that
basic situation still awaits a complete analysis). This means that for any phenomenon using
the idea of an unknown quantum state in its description, we should demand that either
1. The owner of the unknown state—a further decision-making agent or observer—be
explicitly identified. (In this case, the unknown state is merely a stand-in for the
unknown state of knowledge of an essential player who went unrecognized in the original
formulation.) Or,
2. If there is clearly no further agent or observer on the scene, then a way must be found
to reexpress the phenomenon with the term “unknown state” completely banished from
its formulation. (In this case, the end-product of the effort will be a single quantum
state used for describing the phenomenon—namely, the state that actually captures
the describer’s state of knowledge throughout.)
This Section reports the work of Ref. [17] and [18], where such a project is carried out
for the experimental practice of quantum-state tomography [13]. The usual description of
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ψ ψ ψ
!
?
Figure 2: To make sense of quantum tomography, must we go to the extreme of imagining a “man
in the box” who has a better description of the systems than we do? How contrived our usage
would be if that were so!
tomography is this. A device of some sort, say a nonlinear optical medium driven by a laser,
repeatedly prepares many instances of a quantum system, say many temporally distinct
modes of the electromagnetic field, in a fixed quantum state ρ, pure or mixed [64]. An
experimentalist who wishes to characterize the operation of the device or to calibrate it for
future use may be able to perform measurements on the systems it prepares even if he cannot
get at the device itself. This can be useful if the experimenter has some prior knowledge of
the device’s operation that can be translated into a probability distribution over states. Then
learning about the state will also be learning about the device. Most importantly, though,
this description of tomography assumes that the precise state ρ is unknown. The goal of the
experimenter is to perform enough measurements, and enough kinds of measurements (on a
large enough sample), to estimate the identity of ρ.
This is clearly an example where there is no further player on whom to pin the unknown
state as a state of knowledge. Any attempt to find such a missing player would be entirely
artificial: Where would the player be placed? On the inside of the device the tomographer is
trying to characterize?20 The only available course is the second strategy above—to banish
the idea of the unknown state from the formulation of tomography.
To do this, we once again take our cue from Bayesian probability theory [38, 39, 40].
As emphasized previously, in Bayesian theory probabilities—just like quantum states—are
20Placing the player here would be about as respectable as George Berkeley’s famous patch to his philo-
sophical system of idealism. The difficulty is captured engagingly by a limerick of Ronald Knox and its
anonymous reply:
There was a young man who said, “God : Must think it exceedingly odd : If he finds that
this tree : Continues to be : When there’s no one about in the Quad.” REPLY: “Dear Sir:
Your astonishment’s odd. : I am always about in the Quad. : And that’s why the tree : Will
continue to be, : Since observed by Yours faithfully, God.”
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not objective states of nature, but rather measures of credible belief, reflecting one’s state
of knowledge. In light of this, it comes as no surprise that one of the most overarching
Bayesian themes is to identify the conditions under which a set of decision-making agents
can come to a common belief or probability assignment for a random variable even though
their initial beliefs may differ [40]. Following that theme is the key to understanding the
essence of quantum-state tomography.
Indeed, classical Bayesian theory encounters almost precisely the same problem as our
unknown quantum state through the widespread use of the phrase “unknown probability”
in its domain. This is an oxymoron every bit as egregious as unknown state.
The procedure analogous to quantum-state tomography in Bayesian theory is the estima-
tion of an unknown probability from the results of repeated trials on “identically prepared
systems.” The way to eliminate unknown probabilities from this situation was introduced
by Bruno de Finetti in the early 1930s [67]. His method was simply to focus on the equiv-
alence of the repeated trials—namely, that what is really of importance is that the systems
are indistinguishable as far as probabilistic predictions are concerned. Because of this, any
probability assignment p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) for multiple trials should be symmetric under per-
mutation of the systems. As innocent as this conceptual shift may sound, de Finetti was able
to use it to powerful effect. For, with his representation theorem, he showed that any multi-
trial probability assignment that is permutation-symmetric for an arbitrarily large number
of trials—de Finetti called such multi-trial probabilities exchangeable—is equivalent to a
probability for the “unknown probabilities.”
Let us outline this in a little more detail. In an objectivist description of N “identically
prepared systems,” the individual trials are described by discrete random variables xn ∈
{1, 2, . . . , k}, n = 1, . . . , N , and the probability in the multi-trial hypothesis space is given
by an independent identically distributed distribution
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN) = px1px2 · · · pxN = p
n1
1 p
n2
2 · · ·p
nk
k . (89)
The numbers pj describe the objective, “true” probability that the result of a single exper-
iment will be j (j = 1, . . . , k). The variable nj , on the other hand, describes the number
of times outcome j is listed in the vector (x1, x2, . . . , xN). But this description—for the
objectivist—only describes the situation from a kind of “God’s eye” point of view. To the
experimentalist, the “true” probabilities p1, . . . , pk will very often be unknown at the outset.
Thus, his burden is to estimate the unknown probabilities by a statistical analysis of the
experiment’s outcomes.
In the Bayesian approach, however, it does not make sense to talk about estimating a
true probability. Instead, a Bayesian assigns a prior probability distribution p(x1, x2, . . . , xN)
on the multi-trial hypothesis space and uses Bayes’ theorem to update the distribution in
the light of his measurement results. The content of de Finetti’s theorem is this. Assuming
only that
p(xpi(1), xpi(2), . . . , xpi(N)) = p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) (90)
for any permutation π of the set {1, . . . , N}, and that for any integer M > 0, there is a
distribution pN+M(x1, x2, . . . , xN+M) with the same permutation property such that
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) =
∑
xN+1,...,xN+M
pN+M(x1, . . . , xN , xN+1, . . . , xN+M) , (91)
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then p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) can be written uniquely in the form
p(x1, x2, . . . , xN ) =
∫
Sk
P (~p ) px1px2 · · · pxN d~p
=
∫
Sk
P (~p ) pn11 p
n2
2 · · · p
nk
k d~p , (92)
where ~p = (p1, p2, . . . , pk), and the integral is taken over the simplex of such distributions
Sk =

~p : pj ≥ 0 for all j and
k∑
j=1
pj = 1

 . (93)
Furthermore, the function P (~p ) ≥ 0 is required to be a probability density function on the
simplex: ∫
Sk
P (~p ) d~p = 1 , (94)
With this representation theorem, the unsatisfactory concept of an unknown probability
vanishes from the description in favor of the fundamental idea of assigning an exchangeable
probability distribution to multiple trials.
This cue in hand, it is easy to see how to reword the description of quantum-state
tomography to meet our goals. What is relevant is simply a judgment on the part of the
experimenter—notice the essential subjective character of this “judgment”—that there is no
distinction between the systems the device is preparing. In operational terms, this is the
judgment that all the systems are and will be the same as far as observational predictions are
concerned. At first glance this statement might seem to be contentless, but the important
point is this: To make this statement, one need never use the notion of an unknown state—
a completely operational description is good enough. Putting it into technical terms, the
statement is that if the experimenter judges a collection of N of the device’s outputs to have
an overall quantum state ρ(N), he will also judge any permutation of those outputs to have
the same quantum state ρ(N). Moreover, he will do this no matter how large the number N
is. This, complemented only by the consistency condition that for any N the state ρ(N) be
derivable from ρ(N+1), makes for the complete story.
The words “quantum state” appear in this formulation, just as in the original formulation
of tomography, but there is no longer any mention of unknown quantum states. The state
ρ(N) is known by the experimenter (if no one else), for it represents his state of knowledge.
More importantly, the experimenter is in a position to make an unambiguous statement
about the structure of the whole sequence of states ρ(N): Each of the states ρ(N) has a
kind of permutation invariance over its factors. The content of the quantum de Finetti
representation theorem [65, 17] is that a sequence of states ρ(N) can have these properties,
which are said to make it an exchangeable sequence, if and only if each term in it can also
be written in the form
ρ(N) =
∫
Dd
P (ρ) ρ⊗N dρ , (95)
where
ρ⊗N = ρ⊗ ρ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
N -fold tensor
product
(96)
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Here P (ρ) ≥ 0 is a fixed probability distribution over the density operator space Dd, and∫
Dd
P (ρ) dρ = 1 , (97)
where dρ is a suitable measure.
The interpretive import of this theorem is paramount. For it alone gives a mandate to the
term unknown state in the usual description of tomography. It says that the experimenter
can act as if his state of knowledge ρ(N) comes about because he knows there is a “man in
the box,” hidden from view, repeatedly preparing the same state ρ. He does not know which
such state, and the best he can say about the unknown state is captured in the probability
distribution P (ρ).
The quantum de Finetti theorem furthermore makes a connection to the overarching
theme of Bayesianism stressed above. It guarantees for two independent observers—as long
as they have a rather minimal agreement in their initial beliefs—that the outcomes of a suf-
ficiently informative set of measurements will force a convergence in their state assignments
for the remaining systems [18]. This “minimal” agreement is characterized by a judgment on
the part of both parties that the sequence of systems is exchangeable, as described above, and
a promise that the observers are not absolutely inflexible in their opinions. Quantitatively,
the latter means that though P (ρ) may be arbitrarily close to zero, it can never vanish.
This coming to agreement works because an exchangeable density operator sequence can
be updated to reflect information gathered from measurements by a another quantum version
of Bayes’s rule for updating probabilities [18]. Specifically, if measurements on K systems
yield results DK , then the state of additional systems is constructed as in Eq. (95), but using
an updated probability on density operators given by
P (ρ|DK) =
P (DK |ρ)P (ρ)
P (DK)
. (98)
Here P (DK |ρ) is the probability to obtain the measurement results DK , given the state ρ
⊗K
for the K measured systems, and
P (DK) =
∫
Dd
P (DK |ρ)P (ρ) dρ (99)
is the unconditional probability for the measurement results. For a sufficiently informative
set of measurements, as K becomes large, the updated probability P (ρ|DK) becomes highly
peaked on a particular state ρDK dictated by the measurement results, regardless of the prior
probability P (ρ), as long as P (ρ) is nonzero in a neighborhood of ρDK . Suppose the two
observers have different initial beliefs, encapsulated in different priors Pi(ρ), i = 1, 2. The
measurement results force them to a common state of knowledge in which any number N of
additional systems are assigned the product state ρ⊗NDK , i.e.,∫
Pi(ρ|DK) ρ
⊗N dρ −→ ρ⊗NDK , (100)
independent of i, for K sufficiently large.
This shifts the perspective on the purpose of quantum-state tomography: It is not about
uncovering some “unknown state of nature,” but rather about the various observers’ coming
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to agreement over future probabilistic predictions. In this connection, it is interesting to
note that the quantum de Finetti theorem and the conclusions just drawn from it work only
within the framework of complex vector-space quantum mechanics. For quantum mechanics
based on real Hilbert spaces, the connection between exchangeable density operators and
unknown quantum states does not hold.
A simple counterexample is the following. Consider the N -system state
ρ(N) =
1
2
ρ⊗N+ +
1
2
ρ⊗N− , (101)
where
ρ+ =
1
2
(I + σ2) and ρ− =
1
2
(I − σ2) (102)
and σ1, σ2, and σ3 are the Pauli matrices. In complex-Hilbert-space quantum mechanics,
Eq. (101) is clearly a valid density operator: It corresponds to an equally weighted mixture
of N spin-up particles and N spin-down particles in the y-direction. The state ρ(N) is thus
exchangeable, and the decomposition in Eq. (101) is unique according to the quantum de
Finetti theorem.
But now consider ρ(N) as an operator in real-Hilbert-space quantum mechanics. Despite
its ostensible use of the imaginary number i, it remains a valid quantum state. This is
because, upon expanding the right-hand side of Eq. (101), all the terms with an odd number
of σ2’s cancel away. Yet, even though it is an exchangeable density operator, it cannot be
written in de Finetti form Eq. (95) using only real symmetric operators. This follows because
iσ2 cannot be written as a linear combination of I, σ1, and σ3, while a real-Hilbert-space
de Finetti expansion as in Eq. (95) can only contain those three operators. Hence the de
Finetti theorem does not hold in real-Hilbert-space quantum mechanics.
In classical probability theory, exchangeability characterizes those situations where the
only data relevant for updating a probability distribution are frequency data, i.e., the num-
bers nj in Eq. (92). The quantum de Finetti representation shows that the same is true in
quantum mechanics: Frequency data (with respect to a sufficiently robust measurement)21
are sufficient for updating an exchangeable state to the point where nothing more can be
learned from sequential measurements. That is, one obtains a convergence of the form
Eq. (100), so that ultimately any further measurements on the individual systems will be
statistically independent. That there is no quantum de Finetti theorem in real Hilbert space
means that there are fundamental differences between real and complex Hilbert spaces with
respect to learning from measurement results.
Finally, in summary, let us hang on the point of learning for just a little longer. The
quantum de Finetti theorem shows that the essence of quantum-state tomography is not
in revealing an “element of reality” but in deriving that various agents (who agree some
minimal amount) can come to agreement in their ultimate quantum-state assignments. This
is not the same thing as the stronger statement that “reality does not exist.” It is simply that
one need not go to the extreme of taking the “unknown quantum state” as being objectively
real to make sense of the experimental practice of tomography.
21Technically, this means any POVM {Eb} whose elements span the space of Hermitian operators. See
Ref. [17] for details.
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One is left with the feeling—an almost salty feeling22—that perhaps this is the whole
point to quantum mechanics. That is: Perhaps the missing ingredient for narrowing the
structure of Bayesian probability down to the structure of quantum mechanics has been in
front of us all along. It finds no better expression than in the taking account of the limitations
the physical world poses to our ability to come to agreement.
8 The Oyster and the Quantum
The significance of this development is to give us
insight into the logical possibility of a new and wider
pattern of thought. This takes into account the ob-
server, including the apparatus used by him, differ-
ently from the way it was done in classical physics . . .
In the new pattern of thought we do not assume any
longer the detached observer,occurring in the idealiza-
tions of this classical type of theory, but an observer
who by his indeterminable effects creates a new sit-
uation, theoretically described as a new state of the
observed system. . . .
Nevertheless, there remains still in the new kind
of theory an objective reality, inasmuch as these theo-
ries deny any possibility for the observer to influence
the results of a measurement, once the experimental
arrangement is chosen. Particular qualities of an in-
dividual observer do not enter the conceptual frame-
work of the theory.
— Wolfgang Pauli, 1954
A grain of sand falls into the shell of an oyster and the result is a pearl. The oyster’s
sensitivity to the touch is the source of one of our most beautiful gems. In the 75 years
that have passed since the founding of quantum mechanics, only the last 10 have turned
to a view and an attitude that may finally reveal the essence of the theory. The quantum
world is sensitive to the touch, and that may well be one of the best things about it. Quan-
tum information science—with its three prongs of quantum information theory, quantum
cryptography, and quantum computing—leads the way in telling us how to quantify that
sentence. Quantum algorithms can be exponentially faster than classical algorithms. Secret
keys can be encoded into physical systems in such a way as to reveal whether information
has been gathered about them. The list of triumphs keeps growing.
The key to so much of this has been simply in a change of attitude. This can be seen by
going back to almost any older textbook on quantum mechanics: Nine times out of ten, the
Heisenberg uncertainty relation is presented in a way that conveys the feeling that we have
been short-changed by the physical world.
22Working under the presumption that no interpretation of quantum mechanics is worth its salt unless it
raises as many technical questions as it answers philosophical ones.
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“Look at classical physics, how nice it is: We can measure a particle’s position and
momentum with as much accuracy as we would like. How limiting quantum theory is
instead. We are stuck with
∆x∆p ≥
1
2
h¯ ,
and there is just nothing we can do about it. The task of physics is just to sober up
to this state of affairs and make the best of it.”
How this contrasts with the point of departure of quantum information science! There the
task is not to ask what limits quantum mechanics places upon us, but what novel, productive
things we can do in the quantum world that we could not have done otherwise. In what
ways is the quantum world fantastically better than the classical one?
If one is looking for something “real” in quantum theory, what more direct tack could
one take than to look to its technologies? People may argue about the objective reality
of the wave function ad infinitum, but few would argue about the existence of quantum
cryptography as a solid prediction of the theory. Why not take that or a similar effect as
the grounding for what quantum mechanics is trying to tell us about nature?
Let us try to give this imprecise set of thoughts some shape by molding quantum cryp-
tography into the vision built up in the previous sections. For quantum key distribution it
is essential to be able to prepare a physical system in one or another quantum state drawn
from some fixed nonorthogonal set [63, 68]. These nonorthogonal states are used to encode
a potentially secret cryptographic key to be shared between the sender and receiver. The
information an eavesdropper seeks is about which quantum state was actually prepared in
each individual transmission. What is novel here is that the encoding of the proposed key
into nonorthogonal states forces the information-gathering process to induce a disturbance
to the overall set of states. That is, the presence of an active eavesdropper transforms the
initial pure states into a set of mixed states or, at the very least, into a set of pure states with
larger overlaps than before. This action ultimately boils down to a loss of predictability for
the sender over the outcomes of the receiver’s measurements and, so, is directly detectable
by the receiver (who reveals some of those outcomes for the sender’s inspection). More
importantly, there is a direct connection between the statistical information gained by an
eavesdropper and the consequent disturbance she must induce to the quantum states in the
process. As the information gathered goes up, the necessary disturbance also goes up in a
precisely formalizable way [69].
Note the two ingredients that appear in this scenario. First, the information gathering
or measurement is grounded with respect to one observer (in this case, the eavesdropper),
while the disturbance is grounded with respect to another (here, the sender). In particular,
the disturbance is a disturbance to the sender’s previous information—this is measured
by her diminished ability to predict the outcomes of certain measurements the legitimate
receiver might perform. No hint of any variable intrinsic to the system is made use of in this
formulation of the idea of “measurement causing disturbance.”
The second ingredient is that one must consider at least two possible nonorthogonal
preparations in order for the formulation to have any meaning. This is because the informa-
tion gathering is not about some classically-defined observable—i.e., about some unknown
hidden variable or reality intrinsic to the system—but is instead about which of the unknown
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states the sender actually prepared. The lesson is this: Forget about the unknown prepara-
tion, and the random outcome of the quantum measurement is information about nothing.
It is simply “quantum noise” with no connection to any preexisting variable.
How crucial is this second ingredient—that is, that there be at least two nonorthogonal
states within the set under consideration? We can address its necessity by making a shift in
the account above: One might say that the eavesdropper’s goal is not so much to uncover the
identity of the unknown quantum state, but to sharpen her predictability over the receiver’s
measurement outcomes. In fact, she would like to do this at the same time as disturbing
the sender’s predictions as little as possible. Changing the language still further to the
terminology of Section 4, the eavesdropper’s actions serve to sharpen her information about
the potential consequences of the receiver’s further interventions on the system. (Again, she
would like to do this while minimally diminishing the sender’s previous information about
those same consequences.) In the cryptographic context, a byproduct of this effort is that
the eavesdropper ultimately comes to a more sound prediction of the secret key. From the
present point of view, however, the importance of this change of language is that it leads to
an almost Bayesian perspective on the information–disturbance problem.
As previously emphasized, within Bayesian probability the most significant theme is to
identify the conditions under which a set of decision-making agents can come to a com-
mon probability assignment for some random variable in spite of the fact that their initial
probabilities differ [40]. One might similarly view the process of quantum eavesdropping.
The sender and the eavesdropper start off initially with differing quantum state assignments
for a single physical system. In this case it so happens that the sender can make sharper
predictions than the eavesdropper about the outcomes of the receiver’s measurements. The
eavesdropper, not satisfied with this situation, performs a measurement on the system in
an attempt to sharpen those predictions. In particular, there is an attempt to come into
something of an agreement with the sender but without revealing the outcomes of her mea-
surements or, indeed, her very presence.
It is at this point that a distinct property of the quantum world makes itself known. The
eavesdropper’s attempt to surreptitiously come into alignment with the sender’s predictabil-
ity is always shunted away from its goal. This shunting of various observer’s predictability is
the subtle manner in which the quantum world is sensitive to our experimental interventions.
And maybe this is our crucial hint! The wedge that drives a distinction between Bayesian
probability theory in general and quantum mechanics in particular is perhaps nothing more
than this “Zing!” of a quantum system that is manifested when an agent interacts with it.
It is this wild sensitivity to the touch that keeps our knowledge and beliefs from ever coming
into too great of an alignment. The most our knowledge about the potential consequences
of our interventions on a system can come into alignment is captured by the mathematical
structure of a pure quantum state |ψ〉. Take all possible information-disturbance curves for
a quantum system, tie them into a bundle, and that is the long-awaited property, the input
we have been looking for from nature.
Or, at least, that is the speculation. Look at that bundle long and hard and we might
just find that it stays together without the help of our tie.
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